

Scott Edelsberg, Esq. (330990)
scott@edelsberglaw.com
EDELSBERG LAW, PA
20900 ne 30TH Ave., Suite 417
Aventura, FL 33180
Office: (305) 975-3320

Counsel for Plaintiff and Proposed Class

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE BODE,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

VS.

NORCAL HOLISTICS, INC.,
a California corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.

CLASS ACTION

**COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE TELEPHONE
CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, ET SEQ.
(TCPA)**

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

1
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
2

3
1. Plaintiff Christine Bode, brings this action against Defendant, Norcal
4 Holistics, Inc., to secure redress for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
5 Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227.
6

7
NATURE OF THE ACTION
8

9
2. This is a putative class action pursuant to the Telephone Consumer
10 Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, *et seq.* (the “TCPA”).
11

12
3. Defendant is a cannabis delivery service. To promote its services,
13 Defendant engages in aggressive unsolicited marketing, harming thousands of
14 consumers in the process.
15

16
4. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant’s
17 illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation,
18 and disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals. Plaintiff also seeks statutory
19 damages on behalf of herself and members of the Class, and any other available legal
20 or equitable remedies.
21

22
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
23

24
5. This Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over this action
25 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the action arises under the Telephone Consumer
26 Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, *et seq.* (“TCPA”).
27

28
6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant and venue is proper
29 in this District because Defendant directs, markets, and provides its business activities
30 to this District, and because Defendant’s unauthorized marketing scheme was directed
31 by Defendant to consumers in this District, including Plaintiff.
32

33
PARTIES
34

35
7. Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this action, was a
36 resident of Sacramento County, California.
37

8. Defendant is a California corporation whose principal office is located at 1750 Iris Ave., Suite 107, Sacramento, California 95815. Defendant directs, markets, and provides its business activities throughout the United States, including throughout the state of California.

9. Unless otherwise indicated, the use of Defendant's name in this Complaint includes all agents, employees, officers, members, directors, heirs, successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, representatives, vendors, and insurers of Defendant.

THE TCPA

10. The TCPA prohibits: (1) any person from calling a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the recipient's prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

11. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”) as “equipment that has the capacity - (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).

12. In an action under the TCPA, a plaintiff must only show that the defendant “called a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice.” *Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012), *aff’d*, 755 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014).

13. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) is empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. According to the FCC’s findings, calls in violation of the TCPA are prohibited because, as Congress found, automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used. *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone*

Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003).

14. In 2012, the FCC issued an order tightening the restrictions for automated telemarketing calls, requiring “prior express **written** consent” for such calls to wireless numbers. *See In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1838 ¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2012) (emphasis supplied).

15. To obtain express written consent for telemarketing calls, a defendant must establish that it secured the plaintiff's signature in a form that gives the plaintiff a "clear and conspicuous disclosure" of the consequences of providing the requested consent....and having received this information, agrees unambiguously to receive such calls at a telephone number the [plaintiff] designates." *In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1837 ¶ 18, 1838 ¶ 20, 1844 ¶ 33, 1857 ¶ 66, 1858 ¶ 71 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 2012).

16. The TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC define “telemarketing” as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12). In determining whether a communication constitutes telemarketing, a court must evaluate the ultimate purpose of the communication. *See Golan v. Veritas Entm't, LLC*, 788 F.3d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 2015).

17. “Neither the TCPA nor its implementing regulations ‘require an explicit mention of a good, product, or service’ where the implication of an improper purpose is ‘clear from the context.’” *Id.* (citing *Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.*, 705 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2012)).

18. “‘Telemarketing’ occurs when the context of a call indicates that it was initiated and transmitted to a person for the purpose of promoting property, goods, or services.” *Golan*, 788 F.3d at 820 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)(iii); 47 C.F.R. §

1 64.1200(f)(12); *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act*
 2 *of 1991*, 18 F.C.C. Rcd at 14098 ¶ 141, 2003 WL 21517853, at *49).

3 19. The FCC has explained that calls motivated in part by the intent to sell
 4 property, goods, or services are considered telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re*
 5 *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd.
 6 14014, ¶¶ 139-142 (2003). This is true whether call recipients are encouraged to
 7 purchase, rent, or invest in property, goods, or services during the call *or in the future*. *Id.*

8 20. In other words, offers “that are part of an overall marketing campaign to
 9 sell property, goods, or services constitute” telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re*
 10 *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd.
 11 14014, ¶ 136 (2003).

12 21. If a call is not deemed telemarketing, a defendant must nevertheless
 13 demonstrate that it obtained the plaintiff’s prior express consent. *See In the Matter of*
 14 *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961,
 15 7991-92 (2015) (requiring express consent “for non-telemarketing and non-advertising
 16 calls”).


17 22. Further, the FCC has issued rulings and clarified that consumers are
 18 entitled to the same consent-based protections for text messages as they are for calls to
 19 wireless numbers. *See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.*, 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)
 20 (The FCC has determined that a text message falls within the meaning of “to make any
 21 call” in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)); *Toney v. Quality Res., Inc.*, 2014 WL 6757978, at *3
 22 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2014) (Defendant bears the burden of showing that it obtained
 23 Plaintiff’s prior express consent before sending him the **text message**). (emphasis
 24 added).

25 23. As recently held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
 26 Circuit: “Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade
 27 the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging a violation

1 under the TCPA ‘need not allege any *additional* harm beyond the one Congress has
 2 identified.’’ *Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp.*, No. 14-55980, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
 3 1591, at *12 (9th Cir. May 4, 2016) (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549
 4 (2016) (emphasis original)).

5 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

6 24. Over the past year Defendant sent numerous telemarketing text messages
 7 to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 7885 (the “7885 Number”), including
 8 the following:



24 25. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular
 25 telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action.

26. Defendant's text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff various cannabis products.

27. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant's various discounts and promotions, which Defendant sends to promote its business.

28. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant's violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.

29. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS.

30. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7885 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 7885 Number.

31. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant's text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. *See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC*, No. 1:14-cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) ("These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.") (citing *Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc.*, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); *Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc.*, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); *Hickey v. Voxernet LLC*, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; *Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co.*, No. 13-CV-132-JEG NJS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL

1 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be
2 impracticable without use of an ATDS)).

3 32. The text messages originated from telephone number 833-405-9951, a
4 number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant.

5 33. The number used by Defendant (833-405-9951) is known as a “long
6 code,” a standard 10-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages *en*
7 *masse*, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and
8 sent from a telephone number operated by an individual.

9 34. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway
10 providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS
11 traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the
12 mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages
13 to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of
14 SMS messages to and from a long code.

15 35. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a
16 combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in
17 this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone
18 numbers using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers
19 from a list without human intervention.

20 36. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the
21 “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text
22 messages without any human involvement.

23 37. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity
24 was in fact utilized by Defendant.

25 38. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which
26 capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

27

39. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

42. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement.

43. To transmit the messages at issue, the Platform automatically executed the following steps:


- a) The Platform retrieved each telephone number from a list of numbers in the sequential order the numbers were listed;
- b) The Platform then generated each number in the sequential order listed and combined each number with the content of Defendant’s message to create “packets” consisting of one telephone number and the message content;
- c) Each packet was then transmitted in the sequential order listed to an SMS aggregator, which acts an intermediary between the Platform, mobile carriers (e.g. AT&T), and consumers.
- d) Upon receipt of each packet, the SMS aggregator transmitted each packet – automatically and with no human intervention – to the respective mobile carrier for the telephone number, again in the sequential order listed by Defendant. Each mobile carrier then sent the message to its customer’s mobile telephone.

44. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of

transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less.

45. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function.

46. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention:



47. Defendant's unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant's text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.

48. Defendant's unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she has several minutes reviewing each of Defendant's unwanted messages. Each time, Plaintiff had to stop what she was doing to either retrieve her phone and/or look down at the phone to review the message.

49. Furthermore, Defendant's text messages took up memory on Plaintiff's cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant's poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes

1 as a result of the phone's memory being taken up. *See*
2 <https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text> (finding that
3 text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a "triple threat" of
4 identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance).

5 Defendant's text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking
6 up space on the recipient phone's memory. *See*
7 <https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text> (finding that
8 spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory
9 space).

10 **CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

11 **PROPOSED CLASS**

12 51. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23,
13 on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated.

14 52. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Class defined as follows:

15 All persons in the United States who, within four
16 years prior to the filing of this action, (1) were sent
17 a text message by or on behalf of Defendant,
18 (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system,
19 (3) for the purpose of soliciting Defendant's goods
and services, (4) without prior express consent of
the recipient, or with the same manner of purported
consent Defendant claims to have obtained from
Plaintiff, if any.

20 53. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class.
21 Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class
22 members number in the several thousands, if not more.

23 **NUMEROSITY**

24 54. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated calls to
25 cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the
26 United States without their prior express consent. The members of the Class, therefore,
27 are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

1 55. The exact number and identities of the members of the Class are unknown
2 at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class
3 members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant's call records.

4 **COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT**

5 56. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to members of
6 the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of
7 the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class
8 are:

- 9 a) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff's and Class
10 members' cellular telephones using an ATDS;
- 11 b) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained
12 prior express written consent to make such calls;
- 13 c) Whether Defendant's conduct was knowing and willful;
- 14 d) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such
15 damages; and
- 16 e) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the
17 future.

18 57. The common questions in this case are capable of having common
19 answers. If Plaintiff's claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to
20 telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the
21 Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and
22 administered in this case.

23 **TYPICALITY**

24 58. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they
25 are all based on the same factual and legal theories.

26 **PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS MEMBERS**

1 59. Plaintiff is a representative who will fully and adequately assert and protect
2 the interests of the Class, and has retained competent counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff is
3 an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
4 Class.

5 **PROCEEDING VIA CLASS ACTION IS SUPERIOR AND ADVISABLE**

6 60. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and
7 efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all
8 members of the Class is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While
9 the aggregate damages sustained by the Class are in the millions of dollars, the individual
10 damages incurred by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant's wrongful
11 conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of
12 individual Class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if
13 every member of the Class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be
14 unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases.

15 61. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create
16 a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for
17 Defendant. For example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the
18 challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be
19 dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties
20 to such actions.

21 **COUNT I**
22 **Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)**
23 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

24 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set
forth herein.

25 63. It is a violation of the TCPA to make "any call (other than a call made for
26 emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using
27

1 any automatic telephone dialing system ... to any telephone number assigned to a ...
2 cellular telephone service" 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

3 64. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment
4 having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-
5 emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members
6 of the Class defined below.

7 65. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had
8 first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact,
9 Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and
10 the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made.

11 66. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by
12 using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to
13 the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their
14 prior express written consent.

15 67. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these
16 calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted
17 an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or
18 knowing.

19 68. As a result of Defendant's conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the
20 TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each
21 entitled to a minimum of \$500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the
22 members of the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. *Id.*

23 **COUNT II**
24 **Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)**
25 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

26 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set
forth herein.

70. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA.

71. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.

72. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.

73. As a result of Defendant's violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of \$1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, prays for the following relief:

- a) An order certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Class as defined above, and appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Class and Plaintiff's counsel as Class Counsel;
- b) An award of actual and statutory damages for Plaintiff and each member of the Class;
- c) As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, *et seq.*, Plaintiff seeks for herself and each member of the Class \$500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 277(b)(3)(B);
- d) As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, *et seq.*, Plaintiff seeks for herself and each member of the Class treble damages, as provided by statute, up to \$1,500.00 for each and every violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 277(b)(3)(B) and § 277(b)(3)(C);

- e) An order declaring that Defendant's actions, as set out above, violate the TCPA;
- f) A declaratory judgment that Defendant's telephone calling equipment constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system under the TCPA;
- g) An injunction requiring Defendant to cease all unsolicited text messaging activity, and to otherwise protect the interests of the Class;
- h) An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using, or contracting the use of, an automatic telephone dialing system without obtaining, recipient's consent to receive calls made with such equipment;
- i) An award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to, *inter alia*, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5; and
- j) Such further and other relief as the Court deems necessary.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff hereby demand a trial by jury.

Dated: July 7, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

EDELSBERG LAW, PA

By: /s/ Scott Edelsberg
Scott Edelsberg

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class